

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND GEOPOLITICAL SCENARIOS

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Stirring up the problem of Armenian-Turkish relations and the forthcoming centenary of the Armenian Genocide prompted to reconsider the current problems of the Armenianness, and to turn to our political history and possible prospects. These tendencies are quite relevant because the changes that take place locally and in the world call for developing a national strategy adequate to the new realities. Of course, it is desirable to have continuous discussions on the issues of national importance. Back in the 19th century the British thinker John Stuart Mill expressed an idea along the lines that the absence of serious discussions on fundamental principles corrupts and distorts those very ideas and principles, and it is difficult to disagree with him on that. It is obvious that without new approaches, the solution of all-Armenian issues (and there are many of them) is at least problematic. Let us try to cover some of them briefly.

The Diaspora: Traditions and New Imperatives

Even a fleeting glance cast upon the situation in the Diaspora is enough to conclude that along with some achievements there are serious problems and losses in this realm. The general impression is that the strategy directed to the survival of the “Armenian communities” is no longer sufficient today for responding adequately to the various challenges these communities face. The previously common way of the life is breaking down under the impact of different external and internal factors, and it is impossible to mitigate, let alone avert these impacts. It is no secret that these realities are in part pertinent to the situation in Armenia as well (RA, NKR and Javakhq). It can be stated that it is time for the Armenian elite to try reconsidering the traditional existing formats and contents of the family, communal, partisan, religious self-organization, and to develop new national concepts. However, if political innovations are to be actually carried out in the mentioned

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directions, one should avoid the “destroy the old, build the new” Bolshevik principle (especially when the ideas about “the new” are obscure, and no preconditions have been formed yet for moving to that “new”). Such quasi-revolutionary approaches lead to the so-called “gaps” in the national spiritual and intellectual domains that hamper the development of the society.

In particular, today opinions can be heard that the Genocide issue has already been “exhausted” and it is time to unite Armeniacy not around the events of the “tragic past,” but around the “timely and positive” ideas. Such problem statement is undoubtedly dilettantish. It is necessary to clearly differentiate the issue of the national memory, political processes of the international recognition and the establishment and implementation of the new all-Armenian projects.

From the spiritual point of view the Genocide and bereavement of homeland (perhaps it is worth to put the term “depatriation”¹ into circulation and, along with “genocide”, assess it politically and legally) are a part of the national consciousness and, in that formulation, they cannot be subject to debates (of course, unless encountered with a total “brainwashing” through manipulative technologies). It also has to be noted that from the psychological point of view the memories of this tragedy contain a motivation for compensatory actions and the political process of international recognition is one of their embodiments.

The Issue of the Genocide Recognition

The process of the Genocide recognition is not only of moral but also of political significance for the Armeniacy. The approaches shaped in the international community regarding this issue affect the “rating” of Turkey and, partially, that of its ally Azerbaijan, determining them as “genocidogenic” states. Thus, the international recognition of the Genocide is a straitjacket of sorts against the possible Turkish-Azerbaijani encroachments, thus increasing the national security level of Armenia. This factor is also an additional substantiation for our stance in the NKR negotiations, and Armenia’s policy to some extent benefited from the international discussions of the issue over the course of the recent Armenian-Turkish diplomatic scuffles. It has to be mentioned also that the Genocide recognition processes are accompanied by such issues as preservation of the cultural heritage and litigation on some property and material assets, which are known to be rather effective and deserve special attention.

At the same time, the political factor of the Genocide so far has been more frequently used by others. For example, the long-awaited word “genocide”, as men-

¹ Some researchers offer term “patriocide”.

tioned H. Nahapetyan's article [1], was pronounced by US president back on April 22, 1981. In the US President's Proclamation 4838 on Days of Remembrance of Victims of the Holocaust, Ronald Reagan had stated: "Like the genocide of the Armenians before it, and the genocide of the Cambodians which followed it — and like too many other such persecutions of too many other peoples — the lessons of the Holocaust must never be forgotten". Such statement suited the logic of the Cold War and was directed against the USSR, because the support to the rising national movements in the Soviet period in Armenia (as well as in other Soviet republics) was in the national interests of the United States¹. Today the situation is different, and a US president is unlikely to pronounce the word "genocide" in the near future, because this time around it contradicts to the current foreign policy of this superpower.

However, it is also clear that had even the whole world recognized the Genocide, it would have not implied the return of Western Armenia to Armenians, and if it would, even then all of our problems could not be resolved. Perhaps in this issue it is necessary to refrain from overestimating the Jewish precedent. The recognition of the Holocaust and reparations by Germany were determined by the latter's defeat — the Allied armies were in Berlin and the well-known trial was taking place in Nurnberg. It has to be also noted that Jews "readied" the creation of their state themselves by decades-long targeted intellectual, ideological, organizational and economic activities. In our case, recognition of the Genocide by Turkey (which is an overly hypothetical scenario and in no way relates to the current government of that country), most probably will look roughly like the regret expressed by the Serbian parliament with regards to the actions against the Bosnian population. Ankara would agree to restitutions only if it finds itself in a position of a disintegrated state.

Consequently, it can be stated that while having a generally positive value, the process of international recognition of the Genocide has some efficiency restrictions and it cannot be treated as the ultimate goal for Armenia and Armeniacy. In other words, if the Armenian Genocide is recognized everywhere, there are no clear ideas on what would be the further political strategy of the Armeniacy after that. The absence of a definite answer to this question proves that there is no critical concentration of the necessary intellectual resources in our society for strategic planning, whereas the scale of such resources directly correlates with the concept of National Security (NS).

¹ As it is known, the permanent national movement in the Second Republic was a key success factor for the victory in the Karabakh conflict, and it would be fair to say that assistance from abroad, however small it might have been, complemented our national interests.

The Contemporary Interpretations of National Security

Today, the notion of NS is transforming and, in addition to the old concepts about the resources necessary for ensuring the national security, the capability to develop the society has become one of the important criteria for the NS [2, p. 3] [3, p. 38]. Particularly, it is supposed that the “challenge-adequate response” system which was believed to be efficient, under current situation is insufficient and using only that principle may even bring to a dead end¹. According to A. Vladimirov’s fundamental work the new approaches assume that “coordination of the development and security paradigms is possible within the dialectics of the “security through development and development through security” principle.” Using such methodology to contemplate the security issues leads to a rather simple conclusion that the human being and the human society are the ones “in charge” for the process of development (i.e. of security) or in other words, they are the *critical infrastructure* for that. The level of their development (in our interpretation – the abilities to organize, and to acquire and apply knowledge) determines the security of a nation and state. This also implies that development is one of the manifestations of a strategy that assumes advancement by both “small steps” and “breakthrough” (after a critical mass of achievements by “small steps” is accumulated), which according to the Chinese formulation, helps to “conquer the future and use it for one’s own purposes”. We do believe the development strategy comprehended in this context should evolve into a prevalent national strategy.

Considering the future goals of Armenia and the Armeniacy against the aforementioned backdrop, it has to be stated that we have serious development problems. It is known that the quality of Armenia’s intellectual potential has diminished over the last twenty years, whereas the development projects for this area do not seem plausible and, furthermore, their nature is theoretical. Meanwhile, the institutionally significant structures of a state must constitute military and scientific systems, and though the former has been established in Armenia, there are many problems concerning the latter. It is remarkable that the priority goal of so-called strategic intelligence is the evaluation of the scientific and technological resources of the supposed adversary, i.e. primarily of its human resources – the knowledge and technology bearers [4, p. 27]. It is assumed that other sectors (army, industry, financial system and etc.) are the derivatives of the scientific and technological potential.

¹In this regard it should be mentioned that the classical principle “challenge-adequate response” is sort of a passive formulation and, apparently, it does not suppose creating preventive “challenges” to the competitors. As it is known, the principles of the NS were “edited” relatively not so long ago under the Bush administration, when the “hyper-preventive” doctrine was developed and implemented, reflecting in the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns.

The situation in the Diaspora is even worse; comprehension of the need for a national science, and resultant thinking and culture have not been formed there yet¹. As it is known, there are thousands of Armenian social and political organizations abroad, which, however, rarely turn to the scientific and educational area (let us note that many other nations with Diaspora have set up numerous foundations sponsoring scientific and educational activities). In this context it should also be stated that there is no understanding of “national capital – national science” correlation, which could have alleviated the situation in absence of the needed state resources (in this respect the exceptions are the *ARG Company* in Armenia and perhaps, the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in the Diaspora). Let us mention that here we do not take into consideration the communal and Sunday schools, the activities of which are mostly directed to the preservation of the Armenian identity. However, even in this dimension the current situation is critical, too.

In our opinion this strategic oversight is conditioned not by the relatively scanty funds and resources², but by the fact that the everyday mentality of the Armenian elite has not reached the level of the national conceptual vision approaches. Too often the process of the Genocide recognition is perceived as an exclusive priority, and for example, considerable funds are spent on lobbying for it in the US. A great importance is also attached to the construction of the churches and monuments. Of course, all of this is unquestionably very important, but at the same time things of paramount importance, such as the formation and development of the human capital are overlooked, thus endangering our national security.

With that in mind it is probably worth asking the question: what are the exact objectives that the strategy and development of the national security should serve?

The Possible Geopolitical Shifts

In the modern history the key events for Armenia and Armenianness were connected to some geopolitical shifts. World War I and revolution led to the Genocide, loss of Western Armenia and part of Eastern Armenia, creation of the First and the Second Republics. After World War II there was a high probability for a clash between the USSR and Turkey, the outcome of which would have been obvious and which could have solved the Armenian Question to a certain extent, but controversies between the former allies – USA, UK and USSR – on “reshaping the world” hampered materi-

¹ An example illustrating this phenomenon is that H₂ ECONOMY, a hydrogen energy and fuel cells laboratory established under the patronage of the American businessman G. Cafesjian, which was one of a kind in the region and effectively functioned for eight years, eventually was shut down citing “low revenues”.

² Let us note that this shortage of resources is conditioned, inter alia, by the underdeveloped scientific and educational sphere of the Armenianness. In particular, there is no much Armenian capital (both in Diaspora and in Armenia) in the high-tech field, which is supposed to be the most profitable one today.

alization of that scenario. As a result of the First Cold War and collapse of the bipolar world, the Republic of Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were created.

In the meanwhile a new political situation is shaping up presently, which may cause new global shifts driven by the quite painful emergence of a multi-polar system. Such systemic shifts are known to be always fraught with some hardly predictable ramifications, and it is not surprising that some political scientists compare the current developments to those on the eve of the World War II. According to some analytical viewpoints based on the trends becoming visible today, the current processes of “division” that fit well in the multi-polar system logic will be followed by formation of new associations based on civilizational characteristics.

Under such conditions, the relative weakening of the US influence in the region becomes one of the most critical factors for Armenia as far as the prospective policy development is concerned. In particular, this is reflected in the difficulties that the USA had with Turkey while carrying out its mediatory mission in the Armenian-Turkish relations. It is also noteworthy in this context that the representatives of the US establishment often appeal today to the necessity for the US to follow the “isolation” policy (of course, relative isolation is meant). Meanwhile, according to some analysts, the American retreat may lead to an explosive situation in the Near and Middle East, and South Asia (the so-called Eurasian Balkans). Note that given the problems related to Iran and especially the processes occurring in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, today this region is in a quite unstable condition as well, which has been mainly provoked by the USA itself. However, curiously enough the US presence ensures “the stability of that instability”. That means the current chaos is more or less controllable, but it will hardly remain so after the departure of the Americans, who as likely as not have foreseen this. It is a common belief that retreat of Anglo-Saxons is more dangerous than their attack...

Obviously, creation of such an uncontrollable region where some countries either already possess or strive to possess nuclear weaponry (Iran being one of them) is a challenge for Armenia, facing which requires new resources and political partners. In this respect the new developments in Europe bring some opportunities.

Germany, Russia and “the Greater Europe”. As it is known the EU was created as an interconnectivity-based structure intended to hamper the ability of separate countries (first of all post-war Germany) to act independently and restore as a mighty power. This mechanism was quite effective in the bipolar system and fared well enough in the mono-polar system. Consequently, though being the largest economy in the world, the EU plays no serious geopolitical role at the global scale. However, in the multi-polar world and amid the financial crisis when the own na-

tional interests became more important, some processes of division surfaced. This is exhibited both by the weakening of US-Europe ties and growing competition between them, as well as by the deepening gap in economic development and other areas between the EU countries.

Germany appeared to be the best prepared to the new situation. Suffice it to mention that over the last 10 years the competitiveness of the German goods and services has grown by 25% as compared to other EU countries. As a result, Germany is currently not only the most powerful economy in the EU, but also the one who dictates (now relying less on France) the rules of the EU dealings. It is natural that Angela Merkel, the German Chancellor is often called “Frau Europe” in the global media.

The military and political ambitions of this country have grown, too. Today representatives of the German elite voice ideas about reforming NATO (meaning to strengthen its European role), possessing nuclear weaponry, having the American bases withdrawn from the country, etc. This suggests that in the near future the “Germanized” EU or, according to some scenarios, Germany and some of its allies acting together outside the EU format, will endeavor to win a decent place in the global geopolitical arena (for example, see [5-7]). In particular, this country may contemplate our region as a platform for attainment of its geopolitical ambitions (Germans show similar aspirations, for instance, in Afghanistan), and in this case such claims apparently would not contradict to our national interests. The following factors point to that:

- Germany does not have any marked oil interests in our region, which are a key factor in the policy of the other Western powers, displayed in their partial attitude towards Azerbaijan.
- The official Berlin has serious problems with Turkey and what plays an important role here, is that there are about 3 million Turks living in Germany, of which 1.7 million are Turkish citizens and a considerable part of them as a matter of principle do not wish to integrate into the German society, with some of them following direct instructions from Ankara. This factor have caused civilizational and demographic problems in the German society, which in its turn partially affected the foreign policy approaches.

The revised project of “Greater Europe” proposed by the German military circles “to face the Eastern challenges” is especially remarkable against this backdrop. It implies Russian membership to NATO and thus, a profound restructuring of this organization. It is obvious that such scenario above all implies preparedness of Russia,

especially given the latter's wariness about NATO and its eastward expansion. Nonetheless, some present tendencies noticed in the Russian policies may make the "Greater Europe" a realistic project, and this is driven not just by the traditional ideas on the Moscow-Berlin geopolitical axis.

At the moment Germany is the main economic partner of the Russian Federation (RF); together they implement large-scale geo-economic energy programs. There are some agreements in the political arena as well (particularly, concerning Georgia's NATO membership). The Europeans also highly praised the presidential elections in Ukraine indicating that this country transforms from an apple of discord between the RF and EU into a ground for cooperation. There are many such examples and without going into details one may state that the idea of creating "Greater Europe" seems to be becoming acceptable to the involved parties by virtue of being adequate to both the logic of the civilizational commonalities and the multi-polar world realities. Under the situation concerned, the US and UK, in contrast to their distinctly negative earlier stance toward the relations between Russia and Germany, now should not be principally opposed to the "Greater Europe" project, because according to some geopolitical scenarios such alliance may become a natural obstacle to the potential expansion of China/East.

In this new-type Third Cold War, Armenia most likely would be aligned with the conditional Europe-RF block, whereas our Turkic speaking neighbors would be in the conditional "East". In this case Armenia may acquire the status of a "border" or "outpost" state (the one of Israel in the Middle East) with all substantial risks and opportunities attached. In case of some positive developments for us, these "opportunities" may include breakup of Turkey and reclaiming at least part of Western Armenia.

Of course, the above mentioned scenario is but a theory and in this regard it has to be mentioned that developing such scenarios requires complex research carried out using state-of-the-art techniques. Yet one should always keep in mind that back in 1980 it was almost impossible to imagine that in a decade a war would break out and two Armenian republics would be established. At the same time it is known that materialization of any "positive scenario" is possible only through making prior efforts toward preparing such developments and bringing forth advantageous scenarios, which in its turn, is possible only under strategic development.

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